Ukrainoznavstvo. – 2010. – №4.
Alla Horska Under the KGB’s Thumb. The Anti-Ukrainian Nature of Special Operations
Oleksiy ZARETSKYI,
Candidate of Philological Sciences, Head of the Department for Coordination of Domestic and Foreign Centers for Ukrainian Studies
Abstract. This article, based on documents declassified in recent years, examines the anti-Ukrainian character of the KGB’s work against A. Horska. It demonstrates a certain systemicity in their actions, and provides an analysis of the KGB's methods and goals. The state security organs not only performed a prohibitive function but also tried to shape public and political opinion. In a broad sense, their goal was to find and destroy the Ukrainian national idea and Ukrainianness in general. The article shows the specifics of liberalized terror under conditions of partial monitoring by the world community.
Keywords: resistance, opposition movement, dissidents, national idea, Ukrainianness, KGB, CPU
In this study, we will attempt to show the goals, methods, motivations, and specific actions of the KGB regarding Alla Horska—one of the leading representatives of the resistance movement (dissidents or figures of the opposition movement). We examine this phenomenon, or rather, this set of phenomena, in a broad Ukrainian studies context according to P. P. Kononenko [20, 247-248]. Thus, we are talking about the formation of the national idea, the struggle for the full restoration of Ukrainian statehood, and the endurance of Ukrainianness in general under conditions of strong pressure from a totalitarian state, which did not shy away from any methods in the arsenal of its special services. We say “under the thumb” because all these actions were of a secret (special, operational) nature, with the exception of a few summonses as a witness [22]. Even the so-called conversations (interviews), seemingly in a semi-official setting, were extralegal. And we use the KGB's own term “special operations.”
The USSR was an ideocratic country with control over almost all aspects of life, particularly by the state security organs. The total control from Stalin's time was not interrupted during the transitional period of 1953-56. Despite the condemnation of some top officials and serious organizational changes (towards reducing the number of units and powers), the personnel, methods (except for physical torture), and work style remained the same. To give a modern researcher an idea of the totality, persistence, and pervasiveness of the state security organs, we point to the 1951 denunciation of V. Symonenko. A “voluntary assistant” (of the then MGB), a neighbor in the dormitory of the T. H. Shevchenko Kyiv State University, indicated that Vasyl Symonenko rated the American writer Jack London higher than the Soviet Semyon Babayevsky. From a modern perspective, this may seem absurd—after all, Jack London was translated, and any translated writer deserved it, as they only published progressive writers, those close to the workers’ movement, communist writers, etc. But the ideocratic system was geared for vigilance in everything. That is, in this case, the organs took information from the “voluntary assistant” that a student said that anything “ours” was worse than anything “theirs.” Symonenko was summoned to the university's special department. So, it is not surprising that anyone could become an enemy [23]. To emphasize the tense, eerie spirit of the era, we recall that in Stalin's time, it was impossible to unequivocally refuse cooperation with the organs. We also note that this denunciation was forever, in accordance with the rules then in force, filed in V. Symonenko’s file (formular).
Regarding the Kyiv milieu of the Ukrainian humanitarian intelligentsia, the state security showed particular vigilance and comprehensiveness. The personnel and methods of the KGB changed little during the 1960s and 70s and, as we will show later, they generally acted against the same representatives of the opposition movement.
One can speak of a somewhat larger scale and systemicity of KGB actions from the late 1960s, when Stalinists gained more weight in the Kremlin. Their determination and aggressiveness are evidenced by the fact that the USSR leadership could throw a numerous coalition army of the Warsaw Pact, which had immense power, at Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the event of using such masses of troops according to operational war plans, soldiers of the Soviet Army and the armies of satellite countries, as well as residents of Czechoslovakia, died just from accidents. Against the backdrop of such unprecedentedly harsh actions, repressions within the USSR itself against human rights activists would not have significantly changed the country’s reputation in the eyes of the world community or its own citizens. This was not the first time the terrorist and aggressive nature of the Soviet leadership was revealed. In line with these changes, V. Fedorchuk was appointed head of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR in the summer of 1970, replacing the more liberal Nikitchenko.
Alla Horska’s biography and socio-political activity have been extensively researched [16, 234–239], and in this article, we focus specifically on the methods, assessments, and goals of the KGB. Today, reports, special reports, and other information (hereafter—reports) from the Committee for State Security under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR (full official name) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine have been preserved and declassified. Working with this specific source requires a certain methodology. The value of these documents also lies in their uniqueness, as a significant part of the KGB documentation was destroyed in the summer of 1990 based on a then-current directive, as their preservation was deemed unnecessary.
We note that this was the highest form of reporting for the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, just like the reporting of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR to the KGB of the USSR. This document flow had signs of oral communication—all KGB reports bore the classification stamp "Return after reading." Thus, the documents were returned to the KGB with resolutions and notes from the party leadership and were stored in one place—the KGB archive. That is, the CC CPU did not have its own KGB information repository and had to react to these reports on a case-by-case basis. We note that many reports have approving resolutions and notes, particularly from P. Yu. Shelest. Power in that country was concentrated in the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CC CPSU, so although in an organizational sense the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR was a structure of dual subordination, there was essentially no separation of powers, and the center of leadership was one—in the Kremlin.
The CC CPU was an organic part of the CPSU leadership. The KGB reported to the Central Committee constantly and in detail. This information is reliable—the reports correspond to reality—they reported what they did. It is quite obvious that some things were kept silent—some things were not reported. Familiarity with these documents shows that disagreements between the KGB and the Central Committee could have been, at most, in matters of tactics; on the whole, their positions coincide. The value of this source is also that it provides analysis and generalizations from the perspective of the KGB, which conducted an enormous amount of work in this area. It must be borne in mind that such documents (and relations in general) are typical of any bureaucracy—the KGB emphasizes the importance of its activities, indicates that it generally fulfills the tasks set, but the enemy is quite powerful, so the operation against the opposition in Ukraine must be long-term and large-scale. And on this basis, they demand a tactical increase in powers, some benefits, as well as the creation of new positions, the development and supply of more advanced eavesdropping equipment, etc. [1]. The language of these documents (a typical officialese) is characterized by certain euphemisms, which are more accurately conveyed in Russian, so we will sometimes provide the original language with a translation (the titles of many documents have been officially translated by the GDA SBU). So, if a special report states, “…izvestnye svoimi ideologicheski nepravil'nymi suzhdeniyami po natsional'nomu voprosu” [2] (“known for their ideologically incorrect judgments on the national question”), and it concerns individuals who were known to have been under surveillance for a long time, this is not accidental. It can be concluded that if the KGB reported on someone, it was never a bureaucratic formality (as if someone was mentioned in passing)—a case file could have been opened on this person, they were summoned for interviews, their phone was tapped, they could be placed under surveillance, their correspondence perlustrated, and an agent-informant could be “set up”—great importance was attached to “live” work.
Let's try to give a generalized characterization of the KGB’s methods and goals, which were organized according to a certain system. According to the principles of policy formation and the rules of internal party games, which had been preserved from Stalin’s times, vigilance was required in the highest leadership circles. This advanced careers. That is, if V. Fedorchuk or V. Malanchuk demanded decisive action against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, other party or KGB leaders could not directly oppose them. This was one of the reasons why the KGB had free rein; they had no brakes and thus consistently and consciously used methods of discreditation, spread rumors, and sowed mutual suspicion among the oppositionists. The KGB tried to act preemptively, striving for complete information coverage while maintaining secrecy and anonymity. The head of the KGB reports this unequivocally and directly:
“…s ispol'zovaniem etikh materialov gotovyatsya meropriyatiya po ego komprometatsii sredi edinomyshlennikov” (“using these materials, measures are being prepared for his compromisation among like-minded people”). At the highest level, they report on secret searches in apartments, etc. [1, 126–127].
It is naive to think that the KGB acted situationally, reacting to individual denunciations or some anti-Soviet manifestations, or suddenly arrested someone to report on work done. Let us recall that the VChK-GPU-NKVD-MGB-KGB did not begin a new stage of its activity either after Stalin’s death, the removal of L. Beria, or the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Thus, in the political-KGB assessment of B. D. Antonenko-Davydovych, his activity during the liberation struggles and his convictions in the 1930s are presented as relevant [3]. Similarly, by the end of the 1960s, the anti-Soviet manifestations they had recorded in the early 1960s remained entirely relevant for the KGB.
Under conditions of total surveillance, priority areas were chosen. We cannot give a clear definition of the mechanism of KGB strategy (which could be the subject of a separate study), but within it, by the mid-1960s, a group was identified as fundamentally hostile, although without a clear final formulation, which the KGB itself gave the working name “Svitlychnyi–Chornovil–Sverstiuk–Horska–Dziuba” (with some changes). But by 1971, the composition of this group was officially approved, and operation “Blok” was launched against it [1].
In the process of constant information gathering, events of greater significance were identified. The KGB also identified active, organized, and influential people. For example, regarding I. Svitlychnyi, the fact of his wide circle of acquaintances and that his opinion was heeded was noted. Potentially dangerous social objects were identified—great attention was paid to formal institutions: the Faculty of Philology of T.H. Shevchenko Kyiv State University, the Writers’ Union, the Artists’ Union; semi-formal ones—the Club of Creative Youth “Suchasnyk,” the “Zhaivoronok” choir, writers' jubilee evenings; and especially informal ones—the system of constant friendly gatherings at Svitlychnyi’s or Horska’s apartment, traditions of picnics in nature, bus trips across Ukraine, etc. Moods were recorded—expressions of elation and optimism were suspicious. The use of the Ukrainian language was a serious signal. Alla Horska’s systematic study of the Ukrainian language with a tutor and her use of it in situations where Russian was usually spoken was by no means viewed lightly, as one might imagine in the 2000s. Such a person put herself in a difficult position; for the KGB, it was a signal, a hostile manifestation [27, 22].
Individualized work was characteristic of the KGB—detailed ideological, social, and psychological profiles were created for the objects of investigation (a KGB term). Among the archival materials that have survived to this day and have been declassified, we had the opportunity to study a report on many hours of interviews with B. D. Antonenko-Davydovych, as a result of which his socio-political characteristic and psychological profile were created [3]. An analysis of the method of its creation and its structure could be the subject of a separate study.
As already noted, in the political-KGB assessment of B. D. Antonenko-Davydovych, his activity during the liberation struggles and his convictions in the 1930s are presented as relevant. Thus, they report: “Vzglyady na eti voprosy u nego ostalis' eshchyo s 20-kh godov, kogda Antonenko-Davydovich vrashchalsya v krugu byvshikh aktivnykh uchastnikov burzhuazno-natsionalisticheskikh formirovaniy perioda grazhdanskoy voyny” (“his views on these issues remained from the 20s, when Antonenko-Davydovych moved in the circle of former active participants of bourgeois-nationalist formations of the civil war period”). The 1935 trial of B. D. Antonenko-Davydovych is simply a “ugolovnoe delo” (criminal case) [3, 111], etc.
The KGB was irritated not only by his ability to establish contacts with representatives of the intelligentsia younger than him, but also by his ability to influence them. B. D. Antonenko-Davydovych’s punctuality and correctness were noted, which significantly strengthened his authority. That is, the KGB recognized the strong points of people (objects of investigation), carefully analyzed them in order to neutralize them. And they measured them by their own KGB yardstick: they did not hide their sharply negative attitude towards them, one can even feel hatred—and this can be traced in seemingly dry bureaucratic reports and memos. One might object that the head of the KGB was feigning aggressive cheerfulness in reports to the Central Committee, but we can assert that sentiments of irreconcilability were present—this is also confirmed by the memoirs of members of the resistance movement.
If these or other methods were used against people from Alla Horska’s circle, particularly B. D. Antonenko-Davydovych, then it can be safely assumed that the same methods were used against her as well.
The KGB reported that the psychological manipulation of B. D. Antonenko-Davydovych under the guise of interviews yielded certain results—he, in their opinion, although he would not change his positions and views, would be less active. It is openly stated that the writer was intimidated—he was warned that if he did not cease his active work, other means of influence would be used against him. We note that the KGB carried out their brutal threats in the form of dark hints. As is known, a large volume of operational information about B. D. Antonenko-Davydovych was used to the detriment of the writer and his family. In particular, the KGB exploited the harmful habits of his son Yevhen to push him towards illegal actions, to arrest him, and in prison to force him to sign documents in order to prevent B. D. Antonenko-Davydovych's marriage to M. Kh. Kotsiubynska, etc. [21, 86].
It can be assumed that if the KGB considered B. D. Antonenko-Davydovych a criminal and showed irritation at the fact that an opposition figure from the 1920s, a participant in the liberation struggles, had not only survived but was full of strength, then the ideological position of Alla Horska, who came from a well-known and very successful nomenklatura family [18], could have caused serious concern, bordering on hatred for her. They surely classified her as a staunch nationalist and an irreconcilable anti-Sovietist.
The KGB identified the character traits and skills of dissidents that they considered a strong point; the KGB painstakingly monitored the oppositionists’ knowledge of KGB methods, particularly the possibilities of eavesdropping, surveillance, etc. The ability to write official complaints, and even more so their distribution in samvydav, caused irritation. They understood that the distribution of an official complaint in samvydav was a means of legalizing samvydav circulation. The sociability of the dissidents was noted—the ability to attract the attention of youth, particularly students, to non-accentuated, officially recognized problems—suppression of the Ukrainian language, poor conditions for the preservation of architectural monuments, etc. And in this, in particular, the fundamentally anti-Ukrainian policy and orientation of their actions was manifested. The absence of a formal organization in the “Svitlychnyi–Chornovil…” group, the ability to conspiratorially resolve issues in the atmosphere of friendly gatherings in apartments, parties, excursions, trips, and concerts, was specifically highlighted. The meetings in a relaxed, festive atmosphere of those returning from the camps, particularly O. Zalyvakha in September 1970, organized by A. Horska, caused great fury.
The sources of financing for the oppositionists aroused particular interest in the KGB and, one can assume, some pathologically morbid reaction. They knew about the mutual aid fund and suspected I. Svitlychnyi and also A. Horska, who was close to him, of this. Great importance was attached to tracking parcels from abroad, which could be officially sold through commission shops and on the market, where ordinary but imported clothing was valued quite highly. A. Horska received such parcels. In the 1980s, the KGB insisted that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine adopt an illegal resolution to restrict parcels from abroad. This strong side of A. Horska's personality was highly rated by the KGB. That is, she, along with I. Svitlychnyi, V. Chornovil, and some others, who were also prominent organizers, was recognized as an enemy by the KGB itself.
It can be assumed that the KGB clearly registered Alla Horska’s confident, stable, and strong life position. In principle, her family generally supported her—her father, O. V. Horskyi [26], her husband, V. I. Zaretskyi, and her son, a schoolboy, O. V. Zaretskyi. The Horska-Zaretskyi couple had an advantageous, though communal, apartment with a telephone in the center of Kyiv (and anyone who enjoyed their trust could drop in for a short while if needed, even without a phone call, exchange news, pick something up, pass something on, etc.), their earnings were heavy and irregular, but they existed. She had a strong support system, and the KGB could not find a crack to, if not recruit, then weaken, disorient, discredit, or introduce conflict into the circle of her relatives and acquaintances.
Alla Horska had great social mobility and adaptability: she easily made acquaintances and established stable friendly relations with people from different social strata and across the widest range. For example, with people who were returning after many years in the camps and had significant problems with socio-psychological rehabilitation, particularly D. Shumuk and V. Duzhynskyi. On the recommendation of Opanas Zalyvakha, she hosted a UPA soldier in Kyiv who was returning from the camps after a more than 20-year term of imprisonment [24, 196]. It is important that she had not known them before.
And, for example, on the other hand, Vira Vovk in her letter to Alla Horska instructs her on how to get to the Brazilian Ambassador in Moscow (on a certain matter) and, moreover, how to speak with him to resolve the issue [14]. It is clear that all of Alla Horska's correspondence with abroad was under the most careful control and was meticulously analyzed.
A number of documents directly concerning Alla Horska have been preserved and made available. They mainly deal with her death. The KGB of the Ukrainian SSR repeatedly sent special reports to the CC CPU regarding the death of A. Horska, the mood of people regarding her death, and the funeral. The fact itself is indicative, as officially A. Horska was not involved in any anti-Soviet or any other officially recorded hostile activity. The only thing that can be noted are the summonses to the KGB as a witness, for confrontations, interviews, and her expulsion from the Artists' Union. A textual microanalysis of the entire body of KGB documentation could bring some additional elements to the understanding of the events. For example, in a memo to the Central Committee regarding the reaction to the conviction of V. Moroz, A. Horska is mentioned [4]. This was 12 days before the first memo about A. Horska's death. And in the margin is a resolution: “VV [to V. V. Fedorchuk] Provide a reference on Horska. Signature [P. Yu. Shelest].” In June 1971, a short special report of 2 pages suddenly appears regarding rumors of her death [5].
We note that the Vasylkiv police, which officially discovered the body on December 2, 1970, had no reason to urgently report to the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR about a presumably domestic crime. But in the next two weeks, between December 3 and 18, the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR sent five special reports to the CC CPU directly concerning Alla Horska [6, 7, 8, 9, 10], and two related to her activities [11, 12]. The short deadlines in which these special reports were sent are striking.
Let’s compare the timing of the investigative actions and the sending of KGB special reports to the Central Committee. There is only an indirect connection between them, but in conjunction with other data, it gives reason to assume a coordination of actions.
The KGB reported the death on December 3—the day after the body was discovered—and on the very day the investigation was launched, which began on December 3 with a resolution by the Vasylkiv district prosecutor, Yatsivskyi. The body was found accidentally by the Vasylkiv police—N. Svitlychna and Ye. Sverstiuk insisted that a policeman open the premises. They write about this in detail in their testimonies-memoirs. On December 5, the next special report was already there—on the very day the decision was made about the choice of cemetery and the organization of the funeral. This special report contains direct proof of a KGB plot—in it, the motivation, reasons, and circumstances of Alla Horska's death are indicated before the investigation reached similar conclusions [7]. Moreover, this was done two days before the case was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Vasylkiv district to the prosecutor’s office of the Kyiv region. On December 7, a corresponding resolution appeared: the first deputy prosecutor of the Kyiv region, senior adviser of justice V. V. Rusanov, ordered that the investigation be entrusted to the deputy head of the investigative department of the Kyiv region prosecutor’s office, adviser of justice V. I. Viktorov (senior of the group) and others [15, 210]. That is, this investigative group had not even started its work yet. This special report raises more questions than it answers and leaves much unclear. For example, V. Fedorchuk for some reason convinces P. Shelest that although A. Horska was not engaged in active anti-Soviet activities in 1967-69, this did not change her assessment by the KGB as a dangerous anti-Sovietist for the existing regime. On December 8—another special report, and this is the day after the funeral on December 7. On December 11 and 18, they reported again on the reaction to the death. Such a rapid response was possible only in the case of constant operational control by the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, determined by a secret, as yet unknown to us, order (almost certainly oral). The source of this information could only be operational secret sources—agents' reports and materials from technical surveillance. In the case of reporting in the established order, such information could have reached the KGB and the CC CPU in several weeks and been included in a monthly or quarterly report. Also, a special report dated December 4 concerns the reaction of representatives of the Ukrainian democratic movement to the conviction of V. Moroz, and on December 11, regarding the contacts of representatives of the Ukrainian democratic movement with the writer Vira Selianksa-Vovk (from Brazil). We note that both were on friendly terms and in contact with A. Horska. The reaction to Alla Horska’s death was scrupulously and carefully monitored. It must be admitted that recording the moods of confusion, depression, and disorientation of our people was the most important task of the state security and the communist authorities during this period. The efficiency with which these measures were carried out leaves no doubt that they were prepared in advance—before the murder and funeral of Alla Horska. Thus, one can speak of at least two authorities involved in ordering, organizing, and carrying out the murder of Alla Horska—the CC CPU and the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR.
The result of the investigation was the same as had been indicated in advance in the special reports: Alla Horska’s father-in-law, Ivan Zaretskyi, was accused, who allegedly committed suicide on December 29, 1970. On January 23, 1971, the case was closed due to the death of the accused. We note that the investigation was supposedly conducted in accordance with the current regulations—expert examinations were conducted, interrogations, etc. All of them later confirmed all the circumstances of the death that had been previously presented in the secret special report of the KGB to the CC CPU.
The case of Alla Horska’s murder was kept in the archive of the prosecutor’s office of the Kyiv region until 2005. Its analysis back in the early 1990s provided a solid evidence base that it had been fabricated [15]. The general picture of the crime is presented in the then-conclusive study “The Death of Alla Horska” [17].
It should be noted that the special operation against Alla Horska continued even after her death on November 28, 1970. She is often mentioned in KGB reports after her death, funeral, and the conclusion of the investigation. One can speak of at least three reasons.
First, the special operation against the circle of acquaintances (the Svitlychnyi–Chornovil... milieu) of Alla Horska not only continues but is gaining momentum, as detailed below.
Second, the KGB believes that Alla Horska is a certain symbol, a sign of this environment. And this organization was not just a special service, but a political-repressive surrogate, so it paid attention to ideological-psychological issues.
Third, much is written about Alla Horska’s death in the West, which was an extremely irritating factor not only for the KGB but for the entire communist leadership [19].
As already noted, the KGB actively interfered in the funeral. The KGB systematically monitored the friends who were demanding the release of the body and arranging the burial place. The KGB obstructed the burial at the Baikove Cemetery and interfered with the organization of the funeral. The KGB tried to prevent mass events at the funeral that would show the number and unity of Alla Horska's friends. Burial at the Baikove Cemetery was predicted as a possible meeting place in the future, etc.
It should be emphasized that preemptive action was in the KGB’s arsenal. This institution not only prohibited but also sought to shape public and political opinion, for example, by organizing articles in the press. This is widely known. The study of the personnel situation at the journal Vsesvit is indicative; it could have been about appointing a new editor-in-chief.
The most important circumstance in the confrontation between Alla Horska and the KGB was that her circle of friends and acquaintances was considered by the KGB to be the strongest and most influential anti-Soviet group. We say this with certainty, as these are the KGB’s own conclusions. The GDA SBU has preserved and declassified a large, thorough analytical report on operation “Blok,” which Fedorchuk sent to Shelest on November 30, 1971 [1]. It provides a sufficiently structured description of the special operation. Thus, we are not reading between the lines, nor are we modeling, but simply retelling the main points (in a broader publication, it would be advisable to provide a facsimile of the entire document). It should be emphasized that the special operation did not involve any new methods but, in our opinion, was a quiet restoration of the methods of the NKVD from Stalin’s times. This operation contained elements of systematic planning, was long-term, and deeply echeloned. The memo contains an assessment of the situation, goals, and methods. It defines the Ukrainian national-democratic center: “A stable nationalist group, which has an organized character of a special kind, and is engaged in hostile nationalist activity.” The KGB’s activity should be aimed at “deepening the contradictions that exist between the members of the group, creating an atmosphere of discord and mistrust…, compromising some of them.” We emphasize the scale: they demand an expansion of staff, the involvement of agents from Russia, and the strengthening of the activities of Czechoslovak special services [1]. Two “firmly formed groups of nationalist elements” were identified—the Kyiv one and the Lviv one—the vast majority of whom were acquaintances of A. Horska, and the leaders identified by the KGB itself—I. Svitlychnyi, I. Dziuba, Ye. Sverstiuk (Kyiv), V. Chornovil, B. Horyn (Lviv)—were her friends and associates.
It can be considered that the operation had an expansionary character. Everyone who came into contact with the objects of operation “Blok” came under KGB control. The connection between special operation “Blok” and Alla Horska is quite obvious. Exactly one day before the report on “Blok,” a report was submitted about the intentions of nationalist-minded individuals to commemorate the anniversary of Alla Horska's death. The lists of individuals under operational investigation in “Blok” and the participants of the memorial service largely overlap. A significant number of these people appeared in KGB documents back in the early 1960s and figure in them until the end of the 1980s. In such a retrospective, the death of Alla Horska on November 28, 1970, the planning of operation “Blok” throughout 1971 (one of the stages of formalization was November 30, 1971), and the arrests of January 1972 are parts of a broad, long-term operation.
November 28, 1971, marked the anniversary of Alla Horska’s death. Alla Horska’s friends commemorated this date [13] and installed a memorial sign on her grave at the Berkovetske (now City) cemetery in Kyiv, and these events were closely monitored by the KGB. A special operation was carried out to identify these individuals, their conversations and moods were recorded, and the memorial sign was photographed. Even a lyric poem in her memory was recorded in some way. This poem was included in the appendices of a KGB report to the Central Committee. Thus, even a year after Alla Horska’s death, the reactions of many people to the circumstances of her death and the general assessment of her personality were studied.
To imagine the scale of this special operation, we should point out that at that time, Ivan Svitlychnyi’s apartment at 35 Umanska Street (in the depths of a then-new microdistrict) was under 24/7 electronic surveillance and external observation [1]. In his report, Colonel-General V. Fedorchuk notes that the surveillance was conducted informally—that is, not only was there sound recording in the apartment, but it was constantly monitored by an operational officer. A whole team worked on it—microphones had to be illegally installed in the apartment (tapping a telephone for recording is much simpler), the recordings had to be promptly transcribed and reported to the leadership on paper. The apartment was also under external surveillance. This means that a car with a driver stood nearby, and the officer actually conducting the surveillance moved in circles (loitered) near the entrance. They had to take shifts throughout the day. That is, just this part of the special operation (against the Svitlychnyi family) was carried out by a sizable team of qualified and, by the standards of those years, well-paid employees. Any recorded contacts of I. Svitlychnyi were checked and, on the instructions of the leadership, were taken into investigation, and this involved hundreds of people. To establish some of them, entire operational-search operations had to be conducted. But this government was not limited either in funding or in administrative resources.
A large team of KGB agents also arrived (and at certain periods was constantly on duty) at the events near Alla Horska's grave. The special reports contain transcripts of speeches at the funeral on December 7, 1970, photos, and likewise at the commemoration of the anniversary. And this is only the tip of the iceberg—as a selection from a large volume of operational material was prepared for the Central Committee. There is no doubt that similar special operations were carried out against Alla Horska during her lifetime.
The activity of the socio-political figure and artist Alla Horska is considered in the context of the endurance of Ukraine and Ukrainianness in the tragic 20th century and in the context of the Sixtiers movement. At a time when the USSR seemed to have achieved stability, significant global influence, and had become a major power in various spheres, processes were underway that were one of the reasons for its collapse and the restoration of an independent Ukrainian state. The circle of friends and associates of Alla Horska—the creative Ukrainian intelligentsia, prominent and talented literary critics, poets, writers, publicists, art historians, and artists—took a principled position regarding the recognition of the Ukrainian people, language, culture, and even statehood. And it was this environment that was qualified by the then-authorities—the party and KGB leadership—as a fundamental enemy of the state. In general, the government's struggle with this movement had an anti-Ukrainian character—everything Ukrainian was under suspicion.
Literature
1. 740-1 Dopovidna zapyska KDB pry RM URSR vid 30.XI.71 r. Pro zavedennia spravy hrupovoi operatyvnoi rozrobky. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 5 (1974 r.). – Spr.1. – Ark. –120 – 153.
2. 282-n Informatsiyne povidomlennia KDB pry RM URSR vid 28 kvitnia 1965 r. Pro zibrannia bilia humanitarnoho korpusu KDU. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 3 (1968 r.). – Spr. 2. – Ark. –119 – 120
3. 262/sh Informatsiia KDB pry RM URSR pro besidy z Antonenkom-Davydovychem B. D. vid 19 kvitnia 1965 r. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 3 (1968 r.). – Spr. 2. – Ark. – 106 - 116.
4. 708-F Spetspovidomlennia KDB pry Radi Ministriv URSR do TsK KPU vid 21.11.1970 r. shchodo reahuvannia predstavnykiv ukrainskoho demokratychnoho rukhu na zasudzhennia V. Ya. Moroza. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 5 (1974 r.). – Spr. 9. – Ark. –141 – 145.
5. 496-1 Spetspovidomlennia KDB pry Radi Ministriv URSR do TsK KPU vid 21.06.1971 r. shchodo reahuvannia predstavnykiv ukrainskoho demokratychnoho rukhu na zahybel A. Horskoi. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 5 (1974 r.). – Spr. 9. – Ark. –164 – 165.
6. 736-1 Spetspovidomlennia KDB pry Radi Ministriv URSR do TsK KPU vid 03.12.1970 r. shchodo zahybeli A. O. Horskoi. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 5 (1974 r.). – Spr. 1. – Ark. – 76.
7. 740-1 Spetspovidomlennia KDB pry Radi Ministriv URSR do TsK KPU vid 05.12.1970 r. shchodo nastroiv aktyvnykh predstavnykiv ukrainskoho demokratychnoho rukhu pislia zasudzhennia V. Ya. Moroza ta zahybeli A. O. Horskoi. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 5 (1974 r.). – Spr. 2. – Ark. – 31-40.
8. 747-1 Spetspovidomlennia KDB pry Radi Ministriv URSR do TsK KPU vid 08.12.1970 r. shchodo pokhoronu A. O. Horskoi. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 5 (1974 r.). – Spr. 1. – Ark. – 270-272.
9. 752-1 Spetspovidomlennia KDB pry Radi Ministriv URSR do TsK KPU vid 11.12.1970 r. shchodo reahuvannia predstavnykiv ukrainskoho demokratychnoho rukhu na zahybel A. O. Horskoi. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 5 (1974 r.). – Spr. 9. – Ark. – 154-161.
10. 772-1 Spetspovidomlennia KDB pry Radi Ministriv URSR do TsK KPU vid 18.12.1970 r. shchodo reahuvannia predstavnykiv ukrainskoho demokratychnoho rukhu na zahybel A. O. Horskoi. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 5 (1974 r.). – Spr. 9. – Ark. – 162-163.
11. 739-1 Spetspovidomlennia KDB pry Radi Ministriv URSR do TsK KPU vid 04.12.1970 r. shchodo reahuvannia predstavnykiv ukrainskoho demokratychnoho rukhu na zasudzhennia V. Ya. Moroza. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 5 (1974 r.). – Spr. 9. – Ark. – 146-149.
12. 755-1 Spetspovidomlennia KDB pry Radi Ministriv URSR do TsK KPU vid 11.12.1970 r. shchodo kontaktiv predstavnykiv ukrainskoho demokratychnoho rukhu z pysmennytseiu V. Selianskoiu-Vovk. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 5 (1974 r.). – Spr. 10. – Ark. – 141-145.
13. 734-1 Spetspovidomlennia KDB pry RM URSR do TsK KPU vid 29.11.1971 r. pro namiry natsionalistychno nalashtovanykh osib vidznachyty richnytsiu smerti A. Horskoi. HDA SBU. – F. 16. – Op. 5 (1974 r.). – Spr. 239. – Ark. –96 – 101.
14. Alla Horska. Zhyttiepys movoiu lystiv / Upor. L. Ohnieva. 2009. – Na pravakh rukopysu.
15. Bilokin S. Zhyttia i smert Ally Horskoi // Alla Horska. Chervona tin kalyny. – Kyiv: Spalakh. – 1996. – 240 s.
16. Zaretskyi O. Alla Horska // Ukrainky v istorii. Kyiv: Lybid. – 2004. – 328 s.
17. Zaretskyi O. Smert Ally Horskoi // Dzerkalo tyzhnia. – 16-22 kvitnia 2005 (№14). – S.14.
18. Zaretskyi O. Rodyna Ally Horskoi v Leningradi: 1930-1940-i roky // Ukrainoznavstvo. – 2010. – №1. – S. 163 – 167.
19. Zaretskyi O. Istorychna pam'iat pro Allu Horsku v 1970-80 rr. // Zbirnyk naukovykh prats NNDIU. – Kyiv, 2010. – T. – . U drutsi.
20. Kononenko P.P. Natsionalna ideia, natsiia, natsionalizm. – Kyiv, 2006. – 358 s.
21. Kotsiubynska M. Knyha spomyniv. – K.: Akta. – 2006. – 288 s.
22. Pevnyi Bohdan. Trahediia Ally Horskoi: pohliad iz zakordonu // Slovo i chas.— 1991.— № 11.— S. 64—72.
23. Perepadia Anatol. V yakiy atmosferi ta z kym navchalysia? // Ukrainskyi samvydav. – 2005. – № 6-7 (14-15). – S. 2.
24. Plaksiy B. Liudyna bez strakhu // Alla Horska. Chervona tin kalyny. – Kyiv, Spalakh. – 1996. – 240 s.
25. Rukh oporu v Ukraini. 1960 – 1990. Entsyklopedychnyi dovidnyk. Kyiv: «Smoloskyp». – 2010. – 804 s.
26. Sverstiuk Ye. Alla Horska i batko // Alla Horska. Zhyttiepys movoiu lystiv / Upor. L. Ohnieva. 2009. – Na pravakh rukopysu.
27. Taniuk Les. Tvory. V 60-y tomakh. T. XI. Shchodennyky 1965 r. (sichen – serpen). – Kyiv: Alterpres. – 2007. – 748 s.
28. Słownik dysydentów. Czołowe postachie ruchów opozycyjnych w krajach komunistychnych w latach 1956 – 1989. – Warszawa: Karta. – 2007. – Tom I, II.
Aleksey Zaretsky
Alla Horska Under the KGB’s Thumb. The Anti-Ukrainian Nature of Special Operations.
Abstract. Based on documents declassified in recent years, this article examines the anti-Ukrainian character of the KGB’s work against Alla Horska. It demonstrates a certain systemicity in their actions and provides a generalized characterization of the KGB’s methods and goals. The state security organs not only performed a prohibitive function but also attempted to shape public and political moods. In a broader sense, their goal was to find and eradicate the Ukrainian national idea and Ukrainianness as a whole. The article shows the specifics of liberalized terror under conditions of partial control by the world community.
Keywords: resistance, opposition movement, dissidents, national idea, Ukrainianness, KGB, CPU.
Oleksiy Zaretskyy
KGB Control of Alla Horska. The Anti-Ukrainian Direction of Special Operations.
Abstract. This article, based on recently declassified documents, investigates the anti-Ukrainian character of the KGB’s activities against Alla Horska. The KGB’s actions had systemic aspects, and its methods and aims were structured. State security not only had functions of prohibition, but also made attempts to shape public opinion. In a wider sense, its aim was to find and suppress representatives of the Ukrainian national idea and Ukrainianness in general. The article shows the specifics of liberalized terror under conditions of partial control by world public opinion.
Key words: opposition movement, dissidents, national idea, Ukrainianness, KGB, CPU