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09.11.2026   Yevhen Zakharov

“Everyone Has the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression”—On the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of the UHG

This article was translated using AI. Please note that the translation may not be fully accurate. The original article

The author reflects on the historic sacrifice of UHG dissidents, comparing their core values—freedom, dignity, and mercy—with the challenges of human rights advocacy during wartime.

Mykola and Raisa Rudenko, Zinaida and Petro Grigorenko, photo: Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance

“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 19

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed after prolonged delays on August 1, 1975, in the capital of Finland by the heads of all European states (except Albania), as well as the United States and Canada, was equated with national legislation and therefore opened legal avenues to fight human rights violations legally and legitimately, drawing on domestic and international law.

The idea of linking security issues to respect for human rights was revolutionary and effectively changed the world. Principle VII of the ten principles underpinning the Final Act was based on the requirements of respecting civil and political rights as formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, referenced the 1966 UN International Covenants, and contained a very powerful provision: participating states “confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties.” This meant, among other things, the possibility of establishing civic organizations that would monitor their states’ compliance with human rights obligations.

Physics professor Yuri Fyodorovich Orlov was the first to realize this: he proposed reading the Helsinki Final Act, which had been conceived as interstate, in a human dimension. To this end, on May 12, 1976, Moscow human rights defenders created the Moscow Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. The second group, initiated by writer and philosopher Mykola Rudenko, General Petro Grigorenko (Moscow), civic activist Oksana Meshko, science-fiction writer Oles Berdnyk, and lawyer Levko Lukyanenko (Chernihiv), was established on November 9, 1976, as the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. Its founding members also included microbiologist Nina Strokata-Karavanska (Tarusa, Kaluga Oblast), engineer Myroslav Marynovych, historian Mykola Matusevych, teacher Oleksa Tykhy (Donetsk region), and lawyer Ivan Kandyba (Pustomyty, Lviv region). They signed the Declaration of its establishment and Memorandum No. 1.

Founders of the UHG, photo: Istorychna Pravda

The Helsinki movement quickly became international: on November 25, 1976, a Helsinki group was founded in Lithuania; on January 14, 1977, in Georgia; on April 1, in Armenia. Since September 1976, the Workers’ Defense Committee (later transformed into the Committee for Social Self-Defense) had already been operating in Poland, and in January 1977, the Charter 77 group emerged in Czechoslovakia. In the United States, a special congressional commission was established.

Human rights defenders effected a revolutionary breakthrough in the consciousness of a population terrorized over the preceding decades: in an unfree country, they began behaving like free citizens, exercising their constitutional rights (freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, etc.) by fait accompli—that is, interpreting laws exactly as written. An independent public opinion emerged in society. From that point on, demagoguery about “interference in the internal affairs of the USSR” whenever basic human rights violations were raised became untenable.

Mykhailo Horyn, Levko Lukyanenko, and Vyacheslav Chornovil, photo: Radio Liberty

The Helsinki phase of dissidence in Ukraine signaled the national movement’s embrace of human rights methods and forms. The idea of human rights resonated deeply with the nonconformist Ukrainian intelligentsia. For those who entered the dissident movement through literature and the arts and could not reconcile themselves with the regime, resisting it morally, this idea was organic. Meanwhile, those dissidents who had pursued political goals and objectives from the outset used the language and framework of human rights ideology, intelligible to the West, to attract greater attention and sympathy toward Ukrainian national issues.

Furthermore, in an era marked by the collapse of the global colonial system, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group served as a reminder of the existence of an enslaved Ukraine and raised the issue of its recognition by the international community. This is vividly illustrated by the goals set out by the Group in its Declaration:

“1) To promote the familiarization of broad circles of the Ukrainian public with the Declaration of Human Rights. To seek to make this international legal document fundamental to relations between the Individual and the State.

2) Proceeding from the conviction that peace among nations cannot be ensured without free contacts between people, as well as without the free exchange of information and ideas, to actively promote the implementation of the humanitarian articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

3) To seek representation for Ukraine as a sovereign European state and UN member with its own delegation at all international conferences where the implementation of the Helsinki Accords is to be reviewed.

4) For the purpose of free exchange of information and ideas, to seek the accreditation of foreign press representatives in Ukraine, the creation of independent press agencies, etc.”

Ivan Kandyba, Nadiya Svitlychna, and Levko Lukyanenko, photo: Radio Liberty

The Ukrainian Helsinki Group united people of diverse worldviews and nationalities because human rights defenders understood: under colonial conditions, there could be no question of respecting human rights—while independence was seen by all as the probable guarantor of freedoms. Everything that was still alive in Ukraine gravitated toward the Helsinki Group. For the first time after decades of repression, this small Ukrainian intelligentsia organized and spoke out before the entire world about the servitude and disenfranchisement of its people. In this sense, the Helsinki movement was far more vital for Ukraine than for nations that already possessed statehood, which is why in our country it proved the most resilient. The milieu surrounding the Ukrainian Helsinki Group was broad and heroically steadfast: former political prisoners, their friends and relatives, and young people who refused to suffocate any longer in the atmosphere of an official, mendacious ideology. The Central Committee of the CPSU and its “vanguard force”—the KGB—were at a loss. After all, they wanted to maintain a “human face” before the world. Yet they could not restrain themselves, and once again revealed their true nature: resorting to time-tested methods—arrests of the most active members and extrajudicial persecution against all sympathizers and suspects.

In total, 41 people joined the Group, 39 of whom were deprived of their liberty. In addition, in 1982 the UHG was joined by two foreign members (Estonian Mart Niklus and Lithuanian Viktoras Petkus), and on December 30, 1987, five more were co-opted. Twenty-four individuals were convicted specifically in connection with their membership in the Group. According to calculations by Vasyl Ovsiyenko, they served over 170 years in concentration camps, prisons, psychiatric hospitals, and internal exile. In total, the Group’s ledger of suffering amounts to more than 550 years of captivity. The Group paid with five lives: Mykhailo Melnyk committed suicide on the eve of his imminent arrest on March 9, 1979, after authorities confiscated a major manuscript on the history of Ukraine that he had spent years writing during a search the previous day. Four prisoners of the special-regime camp VS-389/36 (in the settlement of Kuchino, Chusovoy district, Perm Oblast) died in captivity: Oleksa Tykhy on May 5, 1984; Yuriy Lytvyn on September 4, 1984; Valeriy Marchenko on October 7, 1984; and Vasyl Stus on September 4, 1985.

Despite intense pressure, the UHG never dissolved itself: its documents continued to emerge even from captivity. The External Representation of the UHG published the monthly bulletin Herald of Repression in Ukraine, the Washington-based Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee was active, the Smoloskyp Ukrainian Publishing House named after V. Symonenko published its documents in Ukrainian and English, and all of Ukraine tuned its ears to the jammed broadcasts of Radio Liberty.

The strength and immense moral superiority of Ukrainian human rights defenders over the totalitarian regime lay in the fact that they did not go underground; instead, they signed documents with their own names and openly embraced legalism, appealing to Soviet law and international legal instruments signed by the USSR. They earned well-deserved respect throughout the world. As early as September 23, 1981, in a paper presented at the 13th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in Pacific Grove, the renowned scholar of political thought Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky noted: “…the factually substantiated significance of Ukrainian dissidents is beyond doubt. The sacrifice of these brave men and women testifies to the unbroken spirit of the Ukrainian nation. Their struggle for human and national rights aligns with the trend of universal human progress in the spirit of freedom. Ukrainian dissidents believe that the truth of freedom will prevail. It ill behooves those fortunate enough to live in free countries to believe any less.”

As soon as the first members of the Helsinki groups were released during the era of “glasnost” and “perestroika,” they resumed their human rights activities, which rapidly took on a political character. On July 7, 1988, the Group was transformed into the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, considered a proto-party. It laid the groundwork for the development of a political system in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords occupies a prominent place in the history of the Ukrainian national liberation and human rights movements. Its work, alongside other factors, led Ukraine to independence, creating the opportunity to build a society governed by the rule of law that reflects both the freedom-loving spirit of the Ukrainian people and the letter of international legal instruments.

Today, the era of the UHG seems like distant history. All the more reason why the 50th anniversary of the UHG encourages a comparison between the values and principles of human rights defenders from the 1960s–1980s and those of modern human rights advocacy.

The lion’s share of the “old” human rights defenders were religious people, mostly Christians, and for them the Ten Commandments were of supreme value. Some “new” human rights defenders have preserved an attitude toward them as a foundation. In the 1960s–1980s, human rights were viewed merely as an instrument of civic oversight over the state, a vocabulary with which to discuss social relations—nothing more. But contemporary human rights advocacy is far larger, more diverse, and more multifaceted; it includes many representatives of other religions, agnostics, and atheists. Some theorists believe that human rights have virtually created something akin to a new religion, a new philosophy. For instance, Professor Volodymyr Butkevych, a former judge of the European Court of Human Rights from Ukraine, once even said: “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is my Bible.”

The work of Ukrainian dissidents drew upon traditions established by Ukrainian fellow-countrymen associations back in the postwar Stalinist camps. “It was they who bore the main burden of struggle against the arbitrariness of the Stalin-Beria period and are now an inspiring model that unites those who refused to renounce their convictions—people of honor and duty…” wrote Valeriy Marchenko. The vast majority of participants in the Norilsk and Kengir uprisings in the Stalinist Gulag were Ukrainians. The “virus of defiance,” the yearning for freedom, drove political prisoners to defend their honor and dignity in the face of what seemed like certain death. This “virus” inspired the dissidents of the 1960s–1980s in their urge to “call things by their proper names” (Sverstyuk); it was this very impulse that ultimately brought people out to the Maidans on November 21, 2004, and 2014, served as the driving force behind the victory of two Ukrainian revolutions, and remains today the foundation of the country’s defense against Russian aggression. Thus, the primary value of human rights advocacy has been and remains freedom; it is synonymous with the entire body of human rights. To possess freedom means to freely determine one’s own destiny. There is nothing more horrifying than depending on the will of another person or the will of a state institution.

Dignity was and remains the second key value of human rights advocacy. This refers to universal human dignity, which belongs to everyone, from an infant to a criminal, rather than personal dignity (akin to honor or reputation), which grows as a result of good deeds and is lost through evil ones. Dignity is the best indicator of a violation of freedom. A feeling of affronted dignity always bears witness to injustice, arbitrary violence, or even the criminality of the actions of the one who infringed upon it.

Human rights defenders of the 1960s–1980s rejected the principles of underground and armed activity characteristic of the liberation struggle era; their activities were peaceful, open, and appealed to the law. The slogan of the time was: “Observe your own laws!” Although attempts to form underground anti-Soviet organizations persisted (UNF-1, UNF-2, and others), the debates of that era on this topic are an anachronism today: all modern human rights organizations are open, nonviolent, and grounded in law, especially international law. The use of European legal mechanisms, particularly the European Court of Human Rights, has seen substantial development. In the 1960s–1980s, one could not even dream of this; back then, even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was deemed an anti-Soviet document and confiscated during searches.

An essential value for human rights defenders was and remains independence—from political positions, from public opinion, and from the state. In their stance toward the state, the “old” human rights defenders were guided by a slightly modified version of Shalamov’s code of the Stalinist Gulag prisoner (“Do not believe, do not fear, do not beg”): do not believe the state’s agents, do not fear them, and do not beg for anything.

Today, independence carries even greater weight because it is far more endangered than in the 1960s–1980s—there are too many temptations. It means a principled non-partisanship, a refusal to support any political force, to give a priori assent to ingrained societal stereotypes, or to accept state assistance in any form. However, independence must not devolve into confrontation. The prosecutorial tone that many civic activists adopt toward the state, along with their urge to blame the government for everything, is troubling. The source of human rights violations is human beings themselves and the institutions they construct. We have the state we deserve, because we failed to build a different one. It is better to practice a philosophy of guilt rather than resentment—it is far more constructive to seek the roots of one’s misfortunes within oneself than in others. Yet a substantial portion of the “new” human rights advocates does not realize this.

The principles “Do not fear!” and “Do not beg!” remain relevant for contemporary human rights advocacy, but “Do not believe!” is unacceptable today. Since human rights entail the state’s duty to uphold and guarantee them, and the Ukrainian state declares this to be its primary obligation, human rights defenders must engage in dialogue with it as long as the state remains capable of dialogue. The topic of this dialogue is the state’s actual compliance with human rights. Therefore, the old human rights formula of the 1960s–1980s—“the protection of human rights from organized violence perpetrated by the state”—must today be supplemented: “and assisting the state in ensuring and protecting human rights.” The principle governing the interaction between human rights organizations and the state was formulated in 1988 by Sergei Kovalev: “Honest cooperation among non-like-minded people.” In everything where I agree with the authorities, I am ready to cooperate honestly with them; but when they make mistakes, I will oppose them using available legal methods. Engaging with the state demands a certain level of mutual trust and respect.

Justice is likewise a subject of dialogue between human rights defenders and the state. A distinction must be drawn between two varieties of this value: “procedural” justice, which concerns the outcome of applying a correctly structured legal mechanism, and moral justice, which appeals to values not embodied in law or insufficiently covered by it. In this sense, people speak of social justice, political justice, economic justice, and so forth. The notion of the inevitability of punishment for a crime—that evil must be punished—is first and foremost an expression of a sense of justice.

The values of impartiality and tolerance are in far greater jeopardy today than in the 1960s–1980s. For a human rights defender, it is fundamental that all perspectives be represented in public discourse. Public life must reflect the left, the right, and centrists—all currents of political thought and social activity. A human rights advocate must be tolerant of differing views, including those contrary to their own. They must respect differences in thought and the diversity of civic associations and their goals. Prohibiting certain positions only impoverishes the informational influence on political decision-making. If one envisions the three-tiered system of information–policy–law as a tree—roots, trunk, and crown—restricting the freedom of information is equivalent to the crown forbidding the roots from nourishing the trunk. Such a tree will wither. However, this refers to tolerance toward thoughts and ideas or, more broadly, toward any manifestations of symbolic reality; in physical reality, tolerance toward violent acts and arbitrary rule is out of the question. Under conditions of Russia’s military aggression and the pervasive dominance of deceitful Russian propaganda, these values, along with freedom of opinion, speech, and information, come into conflict with the values of national security and territorial integrity, as well as national-patriotic sentiments. Nothing of the sort existed in the 1960s–1980s. This conflict of values must be examined individually in each specific instance, as there can be no single solution for all cases.

Similar issues exist with the values of humanism and mercy, problems that were absent in the 1960s–1980s. The “old” human rights defenders were a priori humanists who were cruelly wronged by the Soviet state, and speaking with it about mercy was pointless. Today, such discussions also offer little promise due to the military conflict with Russia; furthermore, amid escalating violence and hatred, these values are not supported by a substantial segment of civil society consumed by a desire for vengeance. Unfortunately, even some organizations that identify as human rights groups have not avoided this, whereas for a human rights defender, generally speaking, mercy should stand above justice. Compassion for victims of violence can carry more weight than the state’s motivation to achieve justice. A human rights defender cannot remain indifferent.

One of my occupations since March 2022 has been directing a major project dedicated to gathering information and documenting crimes committed by the Russian military against peaceful residents of Ukraine and civilian objects, which can preliminarily be classified as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

We have documented data on tens of thousands of civilian deaths and injuries, destroyed or substantially damaged civilian objects, individuals unlawfully detained and abducted in occupied territory, and those tortured in captivity. To the victims of these crimes and their families, we provide not only legal assistance, but also psychological, financial, medical, and humanitarian aid. Thousands of families have received it.

Naturally, experiencing even a fraction of this nightmare in one’s own life brings with it hatred toward the leadership of the Russian state and the Russian military. This hatred is most often transferred onto everything Russian—the country, its citizens, language, literature, and art. One could say it becomes all-encompassing.

It is precisely due to the prevalence of hatred in the public consciousness that the axioms of human rights are felt so acutely today: truth is higher than the law; higher than truth is justice; higher than justice is mercy; higher than mercy is love. Hatred primarily destroys those who hate; it hollows out the soul. It is natural only on the battlefield.

In the 1960s–1980s, human rights defense was a voluntary, unpaid endeavor that was rewarded with lengthy prison sentences. In those days, courage, dedication, and self-sacrifice were indispensable qualities of human rights defenders.

Today, human rights work is predominantly paid employment, engaged in by hundreds of civic associations and several thousand people. This activity is welcomed by society and is, generally speaking, safe. Naturally, the high moral virtues of the previous century’s human rights defenders are out of reach for everyone working in this field. Some think more about themselves in human rights advocacy rather than about human rights within themselves; for them, PR takes precedence over the interests of victims of human rights abuses. There are even organizations that could be called “grant-eaters”—those more interested in receiving compensation than in achieving results. A typical remark among workers of such organizations is: “For that kind of money, I won’t work at all!”

I hope that modern human rights advocacy will overcome its growing pains and will worthily stand up for human freedom in today’s difficult circumstances.



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